

Title: How to Verify a Quantum Computation

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Abstract: <p>We give a new theoretical solution to a leading-edge experimental challenge, namely to the verification of quantum computations in the regime of high computational complexity. Our results are given in the language of quantum interactive proof systems. Specifically, we show that any language in BQP has a quantum interactive proof system with a polynomial-time classical verifier (who can also prepare random single-qubit pure states), and a quantum polynomial-time prover. Here, soundness is unconditional---i.e it holds even for computationally unbounded provers. Compared to prior work achieving similar results, our technique does not require the encoding of the input or of the computation; instead, we rely on encryption of the input (together with a method to perform computations on encrypted inputs), and show that the random choice between three types of input (defining a "computational run", versus two types of "test runs") suffice. As a proof technique, we use a reduction to an entanglement-based protocol; this enables a relatively simple analysis for a situation that has previously remained ambiguous in the literature.</p>

# How to Verify a Quantum Computation

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Statistics  
University of Ottawa



PIQuDos seminar  
March 30 2016




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# Scientific method





# Scientific method



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# Scientific method



Testing a theory at various limits

- high energy
- Planck scale,
- close to the speed of light
- ...




Testing a theory in various limits

- high energy
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- ...



**“If you know what you are doing, don’t do it!”**



Jeff Kimble, William L. Valentine Professor of Physics,  
California Institute of Technology



# Quantum Computing

a new “limit” to test:

**Quantum computations in the  
limit of high computational  
complexity**



[Aharonov, Vazirani 2012]

# Quantum Computing

a new “limit” to test:



**Quantum computations in the  
limit of high computational  
complexity**



The predictions of  
quantum  
mechanics are  
exponentially  
difficult to compute



For large-scale  
experiments, need  
an alternative to  
“predict-and-verify”




[Aharonov, Vazirani 2012]




# Boson Sampling

Galton's board: samples from the Binomial distribution



Recently, Groups in Brisbane, Oxford, Rome and Vienna reported the first 3- and 4-photon BosonSampling experiments





Linear optics setup:  
samples from the  
BosonSampling  
distribution

- Difficult to simulate classically



# Boson Sampling

Galton's board: samples from the Binomial distribution



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

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**Big Question:** How does  
one know that the  
outcome is correct?  
(in the regime that classical  
simulation is not possible)



# Boson Sampling

Galton's board: samples from the Binomial distribution



Efficient experimental validation of photonic boson sampling against the uniform distribution

Nicolo Spagnolo,<sup>1</sup> Chiara Vitelli,<sup>1,2</sup> Marco Bentivegna,<sup>1</sup> Daniel J. Brod,<sup>3</sup> Andrea Crespi,<sup>4,5</sup> Fulvio Flamini,<sup>1</sup> Sandro Giacomini,<sup>1</sup> Giorgio Milani,<sup>1</sup> Roberta Ramponi,<sup>4,5</sup> Paolo Mataloni,<sup>1,6</sup> Roberto Osellame,<sup>4,5,\*</sup> Ernesto F. Galvao,<sup>3,†</sup> and Fabio Sciarrino<sup>1,6,‡</sup>

Recently, Groups in Brisbane, Oxford, Rome and Vienna reported the first 3- and 4-photon BosonSampling experiments

BosonSampling Is Far From Uniform

Scott Aaronson\*

Alex Arkhipov†

**Big Question:** How does one know that the outcome is correct?  
(in the regime that classical

classically

Stringent and efficient assessment of Boson-Sampling devices

Malte C. Tichy,<sup>1</sup> Klaus Mayer,<sup>2</sup> Andreas Buchleitner,<sup>2</sup> and Klaus Mølmer<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Physics and Astronomy, Aarhus University, DK-8000 Aarhus, Denmark

<sup>2</sup>Physikalisches Institut, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, D-79104 Freiburg, Germany

(Dated: December 12, 2013)

Boson-Sampling holds the potential to experimentally falsify the Extended Church-Turing thesis. The computational hardness of Boson-Sampling, however, complicates the certification that an experimental device yields correct results in the regime in which it outmatches classical computers. We demonstrate the shortcomings of current protocols, which are bypassed by a model with randomly prepared independent particles. An alternative test based on Fourier matrices is shown to permit more stringent certification for arbitrarily many particles.

# Verification of quantum computations



# Verification of quantum computations



Prover  
(quantum polynomial time)



Verifier  
(classical polynomial-time)



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# Verification of quantum computations




circuit


Prover  
(quantum polynomial time)



Verifier  
(classical polynomial-time)




# Verification of quantum computations



Verifier

(classical polynomial-time)



Prover  
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# Verification of quantum computations



Prover

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
circuit  
output of the circuit

Prover wants to convince verifier  
that output is correctly computed\*



Verifier

(classical polynomial-time)




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\*modulo some probability of error.

# How to verify a quantum computation?




- test small parts, assume they work correctly together?
  - This is not testing at high computational complexity regime
- test computations that are easy to verify?
  - (e.g. factoring)
  - does not encompass the *hardest* quantum problems.



# Static Proofs

e.g. Factoring




**Completeness:** "For a true assertion, there is a proof".

**Soundness:** "For a false assertion no proof exists."

# Static Proofs

e.g. Factoring




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NP: class of languages that admit a static proof (MA for a probabilistic verification)

# Static Proofs

e.g. Factoring



Can we verify more than MA?

**Completeness:** "For a true assertion, there is a proof".

**Soundness:** "For a false assertion no proof exists."




NP: class of languages that admit a static proof (MA for a probabilistic verification)




# The power of interaction





Interaction  
increases the  
power of the  
verification  
process






IP = PSPACE



Everything that can be computed in polynomial space can be proven in an interactive process.



The lady tasting tea  
(Ronald Fisher, 1935)



## **Interactive** verification of quantum computations




Prover is polynomial-time  
quantum computer



Verifier is almost-classical





The lady tasting tea  
(Ronald Fisher, 1935)



## Interactive verification of quantum computations

As an experimenter, I can:

1. verify and characterize very simple quantum systems
2. predict the output of "trivial" quantum computations
3. interact with setup

Main result: 1-3 can be used to **bootstrap** the verification of a general quantum process.



Prover is polynomial-time quantum computer




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
# Prior Approaches



- 
- [1] Ben-Or, Crépeau, Gottesman, Hassidim & Smith 2006  
[2] Aharonov, Ben-Or & Eban 2010  
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# Back to the basics



What makes these protocols work?

How to prove soundness?

input privacy  $\Rightarrow$   
indistinguishability  
of test/computation

Computation-  
by-  
teleportation  $\Rightarrow$   
verification of  
intermediate  
steps

“Equivalent”  
EPR-based  
interactive proof  
system



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## Main Theorem




For all of BQP, there exists an interactive proof system with a verifier  $V$  that runs in classical polynomial probabilistic time, augmented with the capacity to randomly generate states in each  $S_i$ , such that:

- (Completeness) for yes-instances, there exists a **quantum polynomial time** prover that can make  $V$  accept with probability  $\geq 2/3$ .
- (Soundness) for no-instances, no prover (**even unbounded**) can make  $V$  accept with probability  $\geq 1/3$ ,


where  $\{S_1, S_2, S_3, S_4\} = \{\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}, \{|+\rangle, |-\rangle\}, \{P|+\rangle, P|-\rangle\}, \{T|+\rangle, T|-\rangle, PT|+\rangle, PT|-\rangle\}\}$



# Interactive verification of quantum computations



# Interactive verification of quantum computations



Verifier  
randomly  
selects

Computation run

- Evaluate actual circuit on  $|0\rangle$

X- test run

- Compute the identity on  $|0\rangle$  (+ internal checks)

Z-test run

- Compute the identity on  $|+\rangle$  (+ internal checks)





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How to achieve  
indistinguishability?

- Encrypt all communications to the prover
- Prover performs operations on encrypted data
- Prover's operations are the same in test and computation runs
- Only the verifier knows how to interpret results



# The One-time Pad Encryption Scheme



## 1. The classical one-time pad

Plaintext	$x \in \{0, 1\}$
Key	$k \in_R \{0, 1\}$
Ciphertext	$x \oplus k$

Since the ciphertext is uniformly random (as long as  $k$  is random and unknown), the plaintext is perfectly concealed.

## 2. The quantum one-time pad

Plaintext	$ \psi\rangle = \alpha 0\rangle + \beta 1\rangle$
Key	$(a, b) \in_R \{0, 1\}^2$
Ciphertext	$Z^a X^b  \psi\rangle$

$$X = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad Z = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & -1 \end{pmatrix}$$

**Pauli gates**

Without knowledge of the key, the ciphertext always appears as the maximally mixed state,  $\frac{\mathbb{I}}{2}$ .






# Quantum Computing on Encrypted Data



- Encryption is done via a random Pauli

$$Z^a X^b |\psi\rangle$$

- Gates are performed on encrypted data via gadgets




$$\text{CNOT}(|0\rangle|0\rangle) = |0\rangle|0\rangle$$
$$\text{CNOT}(|+\rangle|+\rangle) = |+\rangle|+\rangle$$



## T gate gadget uses an auxiliary qubit


- Computation run:




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
- X-test run:




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
- Computation run:



- X-test run:



- Z-test run:




verification


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
- Computation run:



- X-test run:



- Z-test run:



H gate

$$\begin{aligned} \text{H} \text{PHPHPH} &= \text{H} \\ \text{HHHH} &= \mathbb{I}. \end{aligned}$$


verification



## Soundness:



- Analyse entanglement-based protocol [1]
- 1. Encrypted qubits replaced by half-EPR pairs




[1] Shor & Preskill 2000

## Soundness:




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- 1. Encrypted qubits replaced by half-EPR pairs



[1] Shor & Preskill 2000

## Attacks on the quantum one-time pad



$$\begin{aligned}\rho \mapsto \frac{1}{4^n} \sum_{\text{Paulis } P} P \rho P^* &\mapsto \frac{1}{4^n} \sum_{\text{Paulis } P} U P \rho P^* U^* \\ &= \frac{1}{4^n} \sum_{\substack{\text{Paulis } P, Q, Q'}} \alpha_Q \alpha'_Q Q P \rho P^* Q'^*\end{aligned}$$

$$U = \sum_{\text{Paulis } Q} \alpha_Q Q$$

$$U^* = \sum_{\text{Paulis } Q'} \alpha_{Q'}^* Q'^*$$



## Simplifying a prover's strategy:



1. Delay all measurements.
2. Write P's strategy as the honest strategy, C, followed by a cheating map  $\Phi$  with Kraus terms  $\{E_k\}$ . The system before measurements is:

$$\frac{1}{2^m} \sum_{P \in \text{Paulis}} \sum_k E_k C P |\psi\rangle \langle\psi| P^* C^* E_k^*$$

(Where  $|\psi\rangle$  is some initial state prepared by V).

3. Let  $CP = \tilde{P}C$ . Quantumly apply the decryption operation :

$$\frac{1}{2^m} \sum_{\tilde{P} \in \text{Paulis}} \sum_k \tilde{P}^* E_k \tilde{P} C |\psi\rangle \langle\psi| C^* \tilde{P}^* E_k^* \tilde{P}$$

4. Write each  $E_k, E_k^*$  in the Pauli basis. By the Pauli twirl, we get:

$$\frac{1}{2^m} \sum_{Q \in \text{Paulis}} |\alpha_Q|^2 Q C |\psi\rangle \langle\psi| C^* Q^*$$

Attack= convex  
combination of Pauli  
attacks on output qubits



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
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


## Detecting any Pauli attack




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## Detecting any Pauli attack



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## Conclusion



Interaction increases the power of the verification process



## Conclusion



Interaction increases the power of the verification process



Open question: fully classical verifier?



Thank you!