

Title: Quantum Information Review - Lecture 12

Date: Mar 01, 2011 10:10 AM

URL: <http://pirsa.org/11030001>

Abstract:

Fault Tolerance

- Fault tolerant circuits are designed to avoid error propagation.

Transversal gates



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7-qubit code is particularly good.

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circuits
oid

Thm: \exists threshold error rate
 P_T s.t. if error rate/gate &
time step is less than P_T , then
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quantum computations. To achieve
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circuits
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Threshold $\sim 5\%$
2D $\sim 0.7\%$

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
Proof $\sim 0.1\%$

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Quantum Key Distribution

Classical crypto systems often
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Quantum Key Distribution

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One-time pad: Alice & Bob share key k : n random bits

Encrypt m (n bits long): $m \oplus k = e$
(bitwise XOR)

Decrypt: $e \oplus k = m \oplus k \oplus k = m$

Completely random to Eve

Key Distribution

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one pad: Alice & Bob share

k : n random bits

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Completely
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$$m \oplus k = c$$
$$(m \oplus k) \oplus (m' \oplus k) = m \oplus m'$$

$k = ek$ ← Completely random to Eve

m
 $(m \oplus k) \oplus (m' \oplus k)$
 $= m \oplus m'$

Drawbacks:

- Cannot reuse k
- Keys are as long as message
- Keys need to be kept secret

BB84 protocol
"Bennett - Brassard 1984"

Alice & Bob use
QKD (such as BB84)
to generate k
to use e.g. in one-time
pad.

1984

BB84

time

- ① Alice generate random bit pairs (a_i, r_i)
- ② a_i specifies basis
 r_i specifies state

a_i	r_i
0	0
1	0
1	1

F

- F

- F

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7-q

part

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③ Bob generates N random bits b_i & measure qubit i in basis b_i , getting result s_i .

④ Alice & Bob announce publicly a_i & b_i , $\forall i$.
If $a_i = b_i$, keep bit;
If $a_i \neq b_i$, discard bit;

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After step 4, for remaining bits, should have $r_i = s_i$.

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25% bit error rate

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④ Alice & Bob announce publicly a_i & b_i .

If $a_i = b_i$, keep bit i .

If $a_i \neq b_i$, discard bit i .

(Note: Alice & Bob don't announce r_i & s_i .)

⑤ A

(5) A & B choose some subset of remaining bits & announce r, s; for those bits.

After step bits, show
In real world
Some error
Eavesdropper
- In fact, E
- e.g. Alice s
know a; - s
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(5) A & B choose some subset of remaining bits & announce r, s; for those bits. Calculate error rate on these test bits. If error rate is too high ($\geq 20\%$), they abort (discard key).

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
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⑦ Privacy amplification: $A \& B$

choose random subsets & use the parities of these subsets as final key bits.

i.e. multiply by some random matrix

final key k'



- e.g. know basis and the

dom
 f
 r:
 0 | 10
 1 | 11
 0 | 1+
 1 | 1-
 Bob
 m bits b;
 is b;
 ically a; & b;
 nce r; & s;


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
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
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
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must

o a
tack

B

→ Can use secret key ($\sim \log N$)
Then QKD expands existing
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must


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B

- Can use secret key ($\sim \log N$)
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- Can use other authentication

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