Title: Universal Blind Quantum Computation

Date: May 02, 2008 09:00 AM

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Abstract: I will present a new protocol that was developed entirely in the measurement-based model for quantum computation. Our protocol allows Alice to have Bob carry out a quantum computation for her such that Alice\'s inputs, outputs and computation remain perfectly private, and where Alice does not require any quantum computational power or memory. Alice only needs to be able to prepare single qubits from a finite set and send them to Bob, who has the balance of the required quantum computational resources. Our protocol is interactive: after the initial preparation of quantum states, Alice and Bob use two-way classical communication which enables Alice to drive the computation, giving single-qubit measurement instructions to Bob, depending on previous measurement outcomes. Our protocol is efficient and is presented for the special case of a classical-output; modifications allow the general case of quantum inputs and outputs. We also discuss the use of authentication in order for Alice to detect an uncooperative Bob. Based on joint work with Joseph Fitzsimons and Elham Kashefi

# 20??



### How can users of quantum computers keep their inputs private?











inputs - outputs	Application
Classical-classical (in <b>NP</b> )	factoring using Shor's algorithm
Classical-Classical (other)	<b>BQP</b> -complete problem such as approximation of the Jones polynomial.
Classical-Quantum	Quantum state preparation
Quantum-Classical	QMA: Alice is a quantum verifier in an interactive proof
Quantum-Quantum	<b>QIP</b> : Alice is a verifier in a multi-round quantum interactive proof

info	accomplish all of these with prmation-theoretic privacy & ection of uncooperating Bob
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#### Secure assisted quantum computation

Andrew M. Childs<sup>\*</sup> Center for Theoretical Physics Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge, MA 02139, USA (7 November 2001)

 Alice has a quantum memory, and can perform Pauli gates



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- Alice has a quantum memory, and can perform Pauli gates
- Idea: she sends encrypted qubits to Bob who applies a known gate. Alice can decrypt the qubits while preserving the action of the gate. Repeat, cycling through universal set of gates.

Private Quantum Channels

A. Ambainis, M. Mosca A.Tapp and R. De Wolf (2000); P.O. Boykin and V.

Roychowdhury (2000)

- To encrypt a single qubit, it is sufficient to randomly apply one of the following Pauli operators: {I, X, XZ or Z}.
- To encrypt a single qubit in the x-y plane,

 $rac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0
angle+e^{i heta}|1
angle)$ 

it is sufficient to randomly apply I or Z.

# Previous work-quantum

Blind quantum computation

Pablo Arrighi<sup>1,\*</sup> and Louis Salvail<sup>2,†</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Laboratoire Leibniz, Institut d'Informatique et de Mathématiques Appliquées de Grenoble (IMAG), CNRS UMR 5522, 46 Avenue Félix Viallet, 38031 Grenoble Cedex, France. <sup>2</sup>BRICS, Department of Computer Science, University of Aarhus, Building 540, Ny Munkegade, Aarhus C-8000, Denmark.

- Publicly-known classical random-verifiable function
- Alice gives Bob multiple inputs, most of which are decoys.
- Decoys are verified by Alice. She thus detects a cheating Bob but cannot prevent him from learning about her input.

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# Previous classical work

#### Encrypting Problem Instances

Or ..., Can You Take Advantage of Someone Without Having to Trust Him?

Joan Feigenbaum\*

Computer Science Department Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305

CRYPTO 85



Figure 1. Because the diagram commutes, A learns the value of f(x). A does the inexpensive computations  $x \longrightarrow x'$  and  $f(x') \longrightarrow f(x)$ . B does the expensive computation  $x' \longrightarrow f(x')$ .



f(x

f is encryptable if it fits in the diagram and x' does not reveal anything about x

Figure 1. Because the diagram commutes, A learns the value of f(x). A does the inexpensive computations  $x \longrightarrow x'$  and  $f(x') \longrightarrow f(x)$ . B does the expensive computation  $x' \longrightarrow f(x')$ .

## Previous classical work

On Hiding Information from an Oracle<sup>\*</sup>

Martín Abadi<sup>†</sup> DEC Systems Research Center AT&T Bell Laboratories 130 Lytton Avenue Palo Alto, CA 94301

Joan Feigenbaum<sup>‡</sup> 600 Mountain Avenue Murray Hill, NJ 07974

Joe Kilian§ MIT 545 Technology Square Cambridge, MA 02139

STOC 1987

Impossibility result: No NP-hard function is encryptable (even with polynomial interaction) unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses at the third level.

 Works for any polynomial-size circuit, inputs and outputs can be classical or quantum.

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$$\left\{\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + e^{i\theta}|1\rangle) \mid \theta \in \left\{\frac{n\pi}{8}, n = 0, 1, \dots, 15\right\}\right\}$$

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# First attempt at blind QC







prepares qubits in state

 $|\uparrow\rangle=\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle+|1\rangle)$ 





 entangles according to cluster state





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chooses σ<sub>z</sub>
 measurements







 entangles according to cluster state



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- We want to get rid of \(\sigma\_z\) measurements that reveal the structure of underlying circuit
- We'll show that



yields universal set of gates:H, pi/8 and CNOT

 Tilling the 2-qubit gate enables us to handle multiple inputs







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 $\frac{\pi}{8}$ 

## $\begin{array}{c} 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 \\ 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 \end{array}$







All measurements are in  $\{\frac{n\pi}{8}, n = 0, 1, \dots, 7\}$ 





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• prepares qubits in state  $|\uparrow\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + |1\rangle)$   entangles according to brickwork state



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■ prepares qubits randomly chosen in  $\{\frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(|0\rangle + e^{i\theta}|1\rangle) \mid \theta \in \{\frac{n\pi}{8}, n = 0, 1, ..., 15\}\}$   $|\uparrow\rangle \mid \downarrow\rangle \mid \downarrow\rangle \mid \downarrow\rangle \mid \downarrow\rangle$  $|\uparrow\rangle \mid \downarrow\rangle \mid \downarrow\rangle \mid \downarrow\rangle$ 



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$$\alpha = \phi' + \theta + \pi r$$



a1, a2, a3, a4



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 single-qubit measurements in basis

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## Privacy

Let 
$$\theta = \theta' + k\pi, \theta' \in \{\frac{n\pi}{8}, n = 0, ..., 7\}.$$

Then Alice sends to Bob

$$\begin{split} |\psi\rangle &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + e^{i\theta} |1\rangle) \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + e^{i(\theta' + k\pi)} |1\rangle) \\ &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} (|0\rangle + (-1)^k e^{i\theta'} |1\rangle) \end{split}$$

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Looking at the classical information, that Alice sends Bob:  $\begin{array}{l} \alpha = \phi' + \theta + r\pi \\ = \phi' + \theta' + (k+r)\pi \end{array}$ 

This forms a classical one-time pad and so  $\phi'$  is unknown to Bob.

$$\phi' = (-1)^{s_x} \phi + s_z \pi$$

even if Bob knows  $s_x$  and  $s_z$ , he still cannot find  $\phi$ .

## Quantum input

- Alice applies random Z-rotation to each input qubit, followed by either Pauli-X or I, randomly.
- Alice adds a first layer to her pattern, which undoes the Pauli-X if necessary.
- Remainder of the protocol unchanged.

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### Quantum output

- In Alice's preparation, she does not rotate the qubits of the last layer.
- Run the protocol as usual, except:
  - Bob does not measure the last layer but instead returns the qubits to Alice
  - Alice applies X or Z if necessary to retrieve output. This depends on previous measurement outcomes, which are unknown to Bob.

Authentication

## Authentication

For outputs that <u>can not</u> be easily verified by Alice



- Alice encodes her input into an appropriate authentication code and suitably modifies her gates so that authentication is preserved
- Uncooperative Bob is detected, except with exponentially small probability.

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