Title: The Dark Side of Twin Earth

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Abstract:

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


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
Putnam's argument

- Aim: to show that meaning is not in the head.
- Method: Imagine a remote planet identical to Earth but...

H₂O



XYZ



Putnam's account of grounding

- The meanings of natural kind terms are determined by ostensive definitions of the form:
 - "T' applies to whatever has the structure producing these superficial characteristics."
- This account entails that natural kinds are individuated by their causally relevant deep structure ("deep structure essentialism", or DSE).

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
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There is nothing but text...




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There is nothing but text...







Robot cats



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Robot cats



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- Try to produce a viable account of grounding which
 - does not make us systematically individuate the referents of natural kind terms by their deep structure and
 - 2. explains why XYZ is not water (in general, why deep structure seems to matter somehow).

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Philopi and decapi




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Philopi and decapi



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XYZ's hidden powers



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XYZ's hidden powers



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- Putnam's approach fails to accommodate the fact that externalism works in breadth.
- Putnam's approach is committed to DSE, while it still seems in light of the text and robot cat scenarios that DSE is false.
- We need an account that gives more room to surface properties and less to deep structure.
- We can achieve this by combining the theory theory of concepts with Putnam's claim that natural kind terms are introduced by ostensive definitions.

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The theory theory of concepts

- The central idea of the theory theory is that the features of a natural kind which are essential are normally those which stand in explanatory relations to other essential features.
- For example, people think of birds as "feathered, two-legged creatures with wings, which fly, lay eggs in nests, and live in trees."
- These are features which explain each other in folk ornithology.

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SE's explanatory power

- The original Twin Earth scenario.
- The text and robot cat scenarios: teleology trumps physics in the explanatory order.
- The philopus scenario: a case of expansion in breadth.
- The explosive XYZ scenario: a hybrid case.

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- The text and robot cat scenarios (as well as many others)
 refute deep structure essentialism, which is almost
 always run together with externalism at the level of
 grounding.
- This criticism must be addressed.
- My response:
 - There is stronger evidence than Twin Earth for externalism at the level of grounding, e.g. the philopus and explosive XYZ scenarios. These scenarios can be explained without DSE.
 - There is an externalist account (surface externalism) which yields the right predictions for the threatening scenarios, as well as all others I'm aware of.

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