

Title: The Dark Side of Twin Earth

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Abstract:

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





# Putnam's argument

- Aim: to show that meaning is not in the head.
- Method: Imagine a remote planet identical to Earth but...

**H<sub>2</sub>O**



**XYZ**



# Putnam's account of grounding

- The meanings of natural kind terms are determined by ostensive definitions of the form:
  - “‘T’ applies to whatever has the structure producing *these* superficial characteristics.”
- This account entails that natural kinds are individuated by their causally relevant deep structure (“deep structure essentialism”, or DSE).



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## The internalist strategy

- Almost everyone seems to agree that (Necessarily, water = H<sub>2</sub>O) → deep structure essentialism.
- Consequently, Internalists have tried to undermine the externalist thesis indirectly by criticizing deep structure essentialism.

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
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
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There is nothing but text...








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# Robot cats





# Robot cats



## What externalists should do

- Try to find clearer cases of a different type.
- Try to produce a viable account of grounding which
  1. does not make us systematically individuate the referents of natural kind terms by their deep structure and
  2. explains why XYZ is not water (in general, why deep structure seems to matter somehow).



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


# Philopi and decapi





# XYZ's hidden powers



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# The residual problem

- Putnam's approach fails to accommodate the fact that externalism works in breadth.
- Putnam's approach is committed to DSE, while it still seems in light of the text and robot cat scenarios that DSE is false.
- We need an account that gives more room to surface properties and less to deep structure.
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# The theory theory of concepts

- The central idea of the theory theory is that the features of a natural kind which are essential are normally those which stand in explanatory relations to other essential features.
- For example, people think of birds as “feathered, two-legged creatures with wings, which fly, lay eggs in nests, and live in trees.”
- These are features which explain each other in folk ornithology.

## Surface Externalism

- Natural kind terms are introduced by ostensive definitions of the form: “‘T’ applies to whatever has enough of the *important* features of *this*.”
- A feature of *this* object x is important iff it is an interesting, known feature of x, or it explains an important feature of x, or it is explained by an important feature of x.



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# SE's explanatory power

- The original Twin Earth scenario.
- The text and robot cat scenarios: teleology trumps physics in the explanatory order.
- The philopus scenario: a case of expansion in breadth.
- The explosive XYZ scenario: a hybrid case.



# Summary

- The text and robot cat scenarios (as well as many others) refute deep structure essentialism, which is almost always run together with externalism at the level of grounding.
- This criticism must be addressed.
- My response:
  1. There is stronger evidence than Twin Earth for externalism at the level of grounding, e.g. the philopus and explosive XYZ scenarios. These scenarios can be explained without DSE.
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